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Abstract: Husserl's and Heidegger's positions on intersubjectivity are often perceived as being diametrically opposed. While Husserl privileges a face-to-face approach to intersubjectivity, Heidegger describes Dasein's "being-with" in the context of a hermeneutical description of the world. Moreover, Heidegger sharply criticizes Husserl's intersubjectivity theory, accentuating the distance between the two on this topic. In this article, I argue that despite the many differences between Husserl's and Heidegger's approaches to intersubjectivity, the two philosophers have some notable points in common. I illustrate that, according to Husserl's and Heidegger's explicit intents, the bracketing of the Other is a necessary step for the constitution of the Self. However, I hold that in both philosophers, another position on the relationship between the Self and the Other can be implicitly found, which grants the Other a constitutive role for the possibility of the Self. I maintain that both authors are led to the last position thanks to the phenomenological method, more specifically thanks to the concept of intuition implied in such a method.

Mots-clefs: Husserl, Heidegger, intersubjectivity, Self, Other.

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