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Abstract: This paper aims at demystifying the doctrine of originary givenness. By the doctrine of originary givenness I understand the Husserlian claims that (i) originary presentive experiences are a source of immediate justification, (ii) originary presentive experiences are our ultimate source of justification, and (iii) originary presentive experiences gain their justificatory force precisely from their phenomenal character of originary givenness. It is shown that these claims are immune to Sellars’ objections. Clarifying why the doctrine of originary givenness avoids Sellars’ objections will help us to better understand the relationship between experience and belief as well as the relationship between experiential justification and inferential justification.

Mots-clefs: givenness, Sellars, Husserl, justification.

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