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Vittorio De Palma
Im Denken, aber nicht in den Dingen. Eine phänomenologische Kritik von Hegels Auffassung der Logik als der eigentlichen Metaphysik
Volume 22 (2026), Numéro 2, p. 1-39
Abstract: Hegel holds that reality has a logical structure, because its ontological ground is the thought or the concept. Instead, based on Husserl's phenomenology, I argue that reality is sensuous, that its constitution is not grounded in the formal lawfulness of thinking, but in the material lawfulness of experience, and that the logical thought-forms don’t have real significance. For, as Aristotle already remarked, they arise from the subjective thought-activity, therefore they are in thinking but not in the things. Instead, the sensuous forms do not depend on the subject or the thinking, but on the peculiarity of sensuous contents, and are not merely thought, but given in experience. Only they, therefore, allow the constitution of a real world and can be regarded as ontological. Proper ontology is thus the eidetic description of the sensuous structures of the sensuous given as such, which is independent from the thought-activity and cannot be really modified by it.
Mots-clefs: logic, ontology, Hegel, Husserl, Aristotle.
