article
Vittorio De Palma
Das sinnlich Gegebene als die wahrhafte Wirklichkeit: Husserls Umstülpung von Hegels Idealismus
Volume 16 (2020), Numéro 1, p. 1-25
https://doi.org/10.25518/1782-2041.1141
Abstract: After a reconstruction of Hegel’s conception of reality, it is demonstrated that Husserl’s conception is opposite to it and very similar to Feuerbach’s one. Against Hegel’s theory of universal mediation, it is argued that the immediately given can be described and is the epistemic presupposition of every assertion about the world. After a discussion of Maimon’s and Lewis’ conceptions of the given, it is concluded that — contrary to what Hegel claims — experience is the only ground of knowledge and the real is the other of the idea viz. the heteronomous to thinking, that is the sensuous given, which is not something subjective.
Mots-clefs: Husserl, Hegel, Feuerbach.